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Text 4
It is a curious paradox that we think of the physical sciences as "hard", the social sciences as "soft", and the biological sciences as somewhere in between. This is interpreted to mean that our knowledge of physical systems is more certain than our knowledge of biological systems, and these in turn are more certain than our knowledge of social systems. In terms of bur capacity to sample the relevant universes, however, and the probability that our images of these universes are at least approximately correct, one suspects that a reverse order is more reasonable. We are able to sample earth’s social systems with some degree of confidence that we have a reasonable sample of the total universe being investigated. Our knowledge of social systems, therefore, while it is in many ways extremely inaccurate, is not likely to be seriously Overturned by new discoveries. Even the folk knowledge in social systems on which ordinary life is based in earning, spending, organizing, marrying, taking part in political activities ,fighting and so on, is not very ’dissimilar from the more sophisticated images of the social system derived from the social sciences, even though it is built upon the very imperfect samples of personal experience.
In contrast, our image of the astronomical universe, of even of earth’ s geological history, can easily be subject to revolutionary changes as new data comes in and new theories are worked out. If we define the "security" of our image of various parts of the total system as the probability of their suffering significant changes, then we would reverse the order of hardness and see the social sciences as the most secure, the physical sciences as the least secure ,and again the biological sciences as somewhere in between. Our image of the astronomical universe is the least secure of all simply because we observe such a fantastically small sample of it and its record - keeping is trivial as compared with the rich records of the social systems, or even the limited records of biological systems. Records of the astronomical universe, despite the fact that we see distant things as they were long ago, are limited in the extreme.
Even in regard to such a close neighbor as the moon, which we have actually visited, theories about its origin and history are extremely different, contradictory, and hard to choose among. Our knowledge of physical evolution is incomplete and highly insecure.
A:contradictory theories keep emerging all the time B:new information is constantly coming in C:the direction of their development is difficult to predict D:our knowledge of the physical world is inaccurate
It’s often hard to see your mistakes as you’re making them. "Yikes! The kids are moving back in!" Thus goes the moan of the baby boom generation, around 2007. But letting the kids move back in is not the social error we’re talking about. Instead, the big mistake is the loudly voiced annoyance of the boomers. Most mistakenly decry the notion of the boomerang generation. For example, the authors of a recent book on the topic, Morn, Can 1 Move Back In With You report, "The parents of the 39 million twenty-somethings in the United States face the unprecedented challenge of their children’s prolonged adolescence. " The subtitle of the book is even more revealing: "A survival guide for parents of twenty-somethings. "
In order to fully appreciate the depth of the error being made here, we all need to step back a bit and look at the bigger picture. This epidemic of kids moving back home is first not "unprecedented," and second, it’s not a bad thing. The precedent for this trend can be found among the other 6.2 billion non-Americans on the planet, many of whom happily live with their adult children, often in three-generation households. Finally, the agrarian history of this country before World War II allowed kids to live and work around the farm well into adulthood.
Adult kids moving back home is merely the most noticeable symptom of a larger, fundamental transformation of American society. We are nationally beginning to recognize the costs of the independence the so-called greatest generation imposed on us. Kids in their generation went off to World War II and grew up on the bloody beaches of distant lands. After the war, the survivors had factories to build and the wealth to buy their white-picket-fence dreams out West. They designed a social and fiscal system that has served their retirement years very well. But their historically unique retirement system mistakenly celebrated independence and ignored the natural state of human beings -that is, interdependence. Moreover, their system breaks down with the onslaught of their kids’ retirement.
Regarding boomerang kids, most demographers focus on the immediate explanations for the changes, such as the growing immigrant population, housing shortages and high prices, and out-of-wedlock childbearing. Many psychologists have noted that baby-boomer parents enjoy closer relationships with their fewer children that allow extended cohabitation. However, all these explanations are simply symptoms of the larger, more fundamental reuniting of Americans into households.
The rate at which our American culture is adapting will accelerate as baby boomers begin retiring. Creative housing arrangements are necessitating and allowing three generations to live together again. But such multigenerational households don’t make sense for everyone. The culture itself frequently gets in the way, reinforcing the perception of a stigma attaching to lack of independence. Despite these problems, once you begin talking with your friends about three-generation households, you will begin hearing stories about how such obstacles are being overcome.
In the author’s opinion, demographers and psychologists’ explanations are
A:self-contradictory. B:profound. C:groundless. D:superficial.
Text 1
At some point during their education, biology students are told about a conversation in a pub that took place over 50 years ago. J. B. S. Haldane, a British geneticist, was asked whether he would lay down his life for his country. After doing a quick calculation on the back of a napkin, he said he would do so for two brothers or eight cousins. In other words, he would die to protect the equivalent of his genetic contribution to the next generation.
The theory of kin selection--the idea that animals can pass on their genes by helping their close relatives--is biology’s explanation for seemingly altruistic acts. An individual carrying genes that promote altruism might be expected to die younger than one with "selfish" genes, and thus to have a reduced contribution to the next generation’s genetic pool But if the same individual acts altruistically to protect its relatives, genes for altruistic behavior might nevertheless propagate.
Acts of apparent altruism to non-relatives can also be explained away, in what has become a cottage industry within biology. An animal might care for the offspring of another that it is unrelated to because it hopes to obtain the same benefits for itself later on (a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism). The hunter who generously shares his spoils with others may be doing so in order to signal his superior status to females, and ultimately boost his breeding success. These apparently selfless acts are therefore disguised acts of self-interest.
All of these examples fit economists’ arguments that Homo sapiens is also Homo economicus--maximizing something that economists call utility, and biologists fitness. But there is a residuum of human activity that defies such explanations: people contribute to charities for the homeless, return lost wallets, do voluntary work and tip waiters in restaurants to which they do not plan to return. Both economic rationalism and natural selection offer few explanations for such random acts of kindness. Nor can they easily explain the opposite: spiteful behavior, when someone harms his own interest in order to damage that of another. But people are now trying to find answers.
When a new phenomenon is recognized by science, a name always helps. In a paper in Human Nature, Dr. Fehr and his colleagues argue for a behavioral propensity they call "strong reciprocity". This name is intended to distinguish it from reciprocal altruism. According to Dr. Fehr, a person is a strong reciprocator if he is willing to sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are being kind, and to punish those who are being unkind. Significantly, strong reciprocators will behave this way even if doing so provides no prospect of material rewards in the future.
A:complementary. B:contradictory. C:superficial. D:over-simplified.
In most people’s mind, growth is associated with prosperity. We judge how well the economy is doing by the size of the Gross National Product (GNP), a measure, supposedly, of growth. Equally axiomatic, however, is the notion that increased pressure on declining natural resources must inevitably lead to a decline in prosperity, especially when accompanied by a growth in population. So, which is correct
What growth advocates mean, primarily, when they say growth is necessary for prosperity is that growth is necessary for the smooth functioning of the economic system. In one field the argument in favor of growth is particularly compelling and that is with regard to the Third World. To argue against growth in light of Third World poverty and degradation seems unsympathetic. But is it Could it be that growth, especially the growth of the wealthier countries, has contributed to the impoverishment, not the advancement, of Third World countries If not, how do we account for the desperate straits these countries find themselves in today after a century of dedication to growth
To see how this might be the case we must look at the impact of growth on Third World countries—the reality, not the abstract stages-of-economic-growth theory advocated through rose colored glasses by academicians of the developed world. What good is growth to the people of the Third World if it means the conversion of peasant farms into mechanized agri-businesses producing commodities not for local consumption but for export, if it means the stripping of their land of its mineral and other natural treasures to the benefit of foreign investors and a handful of their local collaborators, if it means the assumption of a crushing foreign indebtedness
Admittedly, this is an oversimplification. But the point, I believe, remains valid: that growth in underdeveloped countries cannot simply be judged in the abstract; it must be judged based on the true nature of growth in these societies, on who benefits and who is harmed, on where growth is leading these people and where it has left them. When considered in this way, it just might be that in the present context growth is more detrimental to the well-being of the wretched of the earth than beneficial.
So, do we need growth for prosperity Only the adoption of zero growth can provide the answer. But that is a test not easily undertaken. Modem economies are incredibly complex phenomena, a tribute to man’s ability to organize and a challenge to his ability to understand. Anything that affects their functioning, such as a policy of zero growth, should not be proposed without a wary carefulness and self-doubting humility. But if the prospect of leaping into the economic unknown is fear-inspiring, equally so is the prospect of letting that fear prevent us from acting when the failure to act could mean untold misery for future generations and perhaps environmental disaster which threaten our very existence.
The author’s attitude towards the impact of growth on the current socio-economic situation is
A:negative. B:positive. C:contradictory. D:uncertain.
In most people’s mind, growth is associated with prosperity. We judge how well the economy is doing by the size of the Gross National Product (GNP), a measure, supposedly, of growth. Equally axiomatic, however, is the notion that increased pressure on declining natural resources must inevitably lead to a decline in prosperity, especially when accompanied by a growth in population. So, which is correct
What growth advocates mean, primarily, when they say growth is necessary for prosperity is that growth is necessary for the smooth functioning of the economic system. In one field the argument in favor of growth is particularly compelling and that is with regard to the Third World. To argue against growth in light of Third World poverty and degradation seems unsympathetic. But is it Could it be that growth, especially the growth of the wealthier countries, has contributed to the impoverishment, not the advancement, of Third World countries If not, how do we account for the desperate straits these countries find themselves in today after a century of dedication to growth
To see how this might be the case we must look at the impact of growth on Third World countries—the reality, not the abstract stages-of-economic-growth theory advocated through rose colored glasses by academicians of the developed world. What good is growth to the people of the Third World if it means the conversion of peasant farms into mechanized agri-businesses producing commodities not for local consumption but for export, if it means the stripping of their land of its mineral and other natural treasures to the benefit of foreign investors and a handful of their local collaborators, if it means the assumption of a crushing foreign indebtedness
Admittedly, this is an oversimplification. But the point, I believe, remains valid: that growth in underdeveloped countries cannot simply be judged in the abstract; it must be judged based on the true nature of growth in these societies, on who benefits and who is harmed, on where growth is leading these people and where it has left them. When considered in this way, it just might be that in the present context growth is more detrimental to the well-being of the wretched of the earth than beneficial.
So, do we need growth for prosperity Only the adoption of zero growth can provide the answer. But that is a test not easily undertaken. Modem economies are incredibly complex phenomena, a tribute to man’s ability to organize and a challenge to his ability to understand. Anything that affects their functioning, such as a policy of zero growth, should not be proposed without a wary carefulness and self-doubting humility. But if the prospect of leaping into the economic unknown is fear-inspiring, equally so is the prospect of letting that fear prevent us from acting when the failure to act could mean untold misery for future generations and perhaps environmental disaster which threaten our very existence.
A:negative. B:positive. C:contradictory. D:uncertain.
At some point during their education, biology students are told about a conversation in a pub that took place over 50 years ago. J. B. S. Haldane, a British geneticist, was asked whether he would lay down his life for his country. After doing a quick calculation on the back of a napkin, he said he would do so for two brothers or eight cousins. In other words, he would die to protect the equivalent of his genetic contribution to the next generation.
The theory of kin selection--the idea that animals can pass on their genes by helping their close relatives--is biology’s explanation for seemingly altruistic acts. An individual carrying genes that promote altruism might be expected to die younger than one with "selfish" genes, and thus to have a reduced contribution to the next generation’s genetic pool. But if the same individual acts altruistically to protect its relatives, genes for altruistic behavior might nevertheless propagate.
Acts of apparent altruism to non-relatives can also be explained away, in what has become a cottage industry within biology. An animal might care for the offspring of another that it is unrelated to because it hopes to obtain the same benefits for itself later on (a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism). The hunter who generously shares his spoils with others may be doing so in order to signal his superior status to females, and ultimately boost his breeding success. These apparently selfless acts are therefore disguised acts of self interest.
All of these examples fit economists’ arguments that Homo sapiens is also Homo economicus--maximizing something that economists call utility, and biologists fitness. But there is a residuum of human activity that defies such explanations: people contribute to charities for the homeless, return lost wallets, do voluntary work and tip waiters in restaurants to which they do not plan to return. Both economic rationalism and natural selection offer few explanations for such random acts of kindness. Nor can they easily explain the opposite: spiteful behavior, when someone harms his own interest in order to damage that of another. But people are now trying to find answers.
When a new phenomenon is recognized by science, a name always helps. In a paper in Human Nature, Dr Fehr and his colleagues argue for a behavioral propensity they call "strong reciprocity". This name is intended to distinguish it from reciprocal altruism. According to Dr Fehr, a person is a strong reciprocator if he is willing to sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are being kind, and to punish those who are being unkind. Significantly, strong reciprocators will behave this way even if doing so provides no prospect of material rewards in the future.
A:complementary. B:contradictory. C:superficial. D:over-simplified.
At some point during their education, biology students are told about a conversation in a pub that took place over 50 years ago. J. B. S. Haldane, a British geneticist, was asked whether he would lay down his life for his country. After doing a quick calculation on the back of a napkin, he said he would do so for two brothers or eight cousins. In other words, he would die to protect the equivalent of his genetic contribution to the next generation.
The theory of kin selection--the idea that animals can pass on their genes by helping their close relatives--is biology’s explanation for seemingly altruistic acts. An individual carrying genes that promote altruism might be expected to die younger than one with "selfish" genes, and thus to have a reduced contribution to the next generation’s genetic pool. But if the same individual acts altruistically to protect its relatives, genes for altruistic behavior might nevertheless propagate.
Acts of apparent altruism to non-relatives can also be explained away, in what has become a cottage industry within biology. An animal might care for the offspring of another that it is unrelated to because it hopes to obtain the same benefits for itself later on (a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism). The hunter who generously shares his spoils with others may be doing so in order to signal his superior status to females, and ultimately boost his breeding success. These apparently selfless acts are therefore disguised acts of self interest.All of these examples fit economists’ arguments that Homo sapiens is also Homo economicus--maximizing something that economists call utility, and biologists fitness. But there is a residuum of human activity that defies such explanations: people contribute to charities for the homeless, return lost wallets, do voluntary work and tip waiters in restaurants to which they do not plan to return. Both economic rationalism and natural selection offer few explanations for such random acts of kindness. Nor can they easily explain the opposite: spiteful behavior, when someone harms his own interest in order to damage that of another. But people are now trying to find answers.
When a new phenomenon is recognized by science, a name always helps. In a paper in Human Nature, Dr Fehr and his colleagues argue for a behavioral propensity they call "strong reciprocity". This name is intended to distinguish it from reciprocal altruism. According to Dr Fehr, a person is a strong reciprocator if he is willing to sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are being kind, and to punish those who are being unkind. Significantly, strong reciprocators will behave this way even if doing so provides no prospect of material rewards in the future.
A:complementary B:contradictory C:superficial D:over-simplified
The ability to contemplate two contradictory thoughts at once is said to be a mark of genius.
A:hypothetical B:profound C:opposing D:mathematical
The ability to contemplate two {{U}}contradictory{{/U}} thoughts at once is said to be a mark of genius.
A:hypothetical B:profound C:opposing D:mathematical
