School Lunch

Research has shown that over half the children in Britain who take their own lunches to school do not eat (1) ______ in the middle of the day. In Britain schools have to (2) ______ meals at lunchtime. Children can (3) ______ to bring their own food or have lunch at the school canteen. One shocking (4) ______ of this research is that school meals are much healthier than lunches prepared by parents. There are strict (5) ______ for the preparation of school meals, which have to include one (6) ______ of fruit and one of vegetables, as well as meat, a dairy item and starchy food like bread or pasta.

Lunchboxes (7) ______ by researchers contained sweet drinks, crisps and chocolate bars. Children (8) ______ twice as much sugar as¹ they should at lunchtime. The research will provide a better (9) ______ of why the percentage of overweight students in Britain has (10) ______ in the last decade. Unfortunately, the government cannot (11) ______ parents, but it can remind them of the² (12) ______ value of milk, fruit and vegetables. Small changes in their children"s diet can (13) ______ their future health.

Children can easily develop bad eating (14) ______ at this age, and parents are the only ones who can (15) ______ it.词汇：

canteen / kaen"ti:n / n.食堂，小卖部

tarchy  / "stɑ:tʃi / adj. (食物)含有大量淀粉的

注释：

1. ... twice as much sugar as ... ：……2倍的糖分……

2. it can remind them of the ... ：提醒他们关于……

空3

A:prefer  B:manage  C:want  D:choose

（）has 3 specific points: fixed port, fixed line and announcing shipping time in advance.

A:liner transport B:line ship C:line container D:line

当用户端cisco路由器上用showinterface命令时line和lineprotocal可能出现的几种组合？（）。

A:line down；line protocol down B:line down；line protocol C:line up；line protocol down D:line up；line protocol up

This line of inquiry did not begin until earlier this month--more than three months after the accident--because there were "too many emotions, too many egos," said retired Adm. Harold Gehman, chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee, Gehman said this part of his inquiry Was in its earliest stages, starting just 10 days ago. But Gehman said he already has concluded it is "inconceivable" that NASA would have been unable or unwilling to attempt a rescue for astronaut, s in orbit if senior shuttle managers and administrators had known there was fatal damage to Columbia’s left wing.
Gehman told reporters after the hearing that answers to these important questions could have enormous impact, since they could place in a different context NASA’s decisions against more aggressively checking possible wing damage in the days before Columbia’s fatal return.
Investigators believe breakaway insulating foam damaged part of Columbia’s wing Shortly after liftoff, allowing superheated air to penetrate the wing during its fiery re-entry on Feb. 1 and melt it from the inside.
Among those decisions was the choice by NASA’s senior shuttle managers and administrators to reject offers of satellite images of possible damage to Columbia’s left wing before the accident. The subject dominated the early part of Wednesday’s hearing. Gehman complained that managers and administrators "missed signals" when they rejected those offers for images, a pointedly harsh assessment of the space agency’s inaction during the 16 day shuttle mission.
"We will attempt to pin this issue down in our report, but there were a number of bureaucratic and administrative missed signals here," Gehman told senators. "We’re not quite so happy with the process."
The investigative board already had recommended that NASA push for better coordination between the space agency and military offices in charge of satellites and telescopes. The U. S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency in March agreed to regularly capture detailed satellite images of space shuttles in orbit.
Still, Gehman said it was unclear whether even images from America’s most sophisticated spy satellites might have detected on Columbia’s wing any damage, which Gehman said could have been as small as two inches square. The precise capabilities of such satellites was a sensitive topic during the Senate hearing.
What does the word "they" (Par

A:A．’3, Line 2) refer to "questions" (Para. 3, Line 1) "answers" (Para. 3, Line 1) "reporters" (Para. 3, Line 1) "investigators" (Para. 4, Line 1)

Text 3
This line of inquiry did not begin until earlier this month—more than three months after the accident—because there were "too many emotions, too many egos," said retired Adm. Harold Gehman, chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee, Gehman said this part of his inquiry was in its earliest stages, starting just 10 days ago. But Gehman said he already has concluded it is "inconceivable" that NASA would have been unable or unwilling to attempt a rescue for astronauts in orbit if senior shuttle managers and administrators had known there was fatal damage to Columbia’s left wing.
Gehman told reporters after the hearing that answers to these important questions could have enormous impact, since they could place in a different context NASA’s decisions against more aggressively checking possible wing damage in the days before Columbia’s fatal return.
Investigators believe breakaway insulating foam damaged part of Columbia’s wing shortly after liftoff, allowing superheated air to penetrate the wing during its fiery re-entry on Feb. 1 and melt it from the inside.
Among those decisions was the choice by NASA’s senior shuttle managers and administrators to reject offers of satellite images of possible damage to Columbia’s left wing before the accident. The subject dominated the early part of Wednesday’s hearing.
Gehman complained that managers and administrators "missed signals" when they rejected those offers for images, a pointedly harsh assessment of the space agency’s inaction during the 16-day shuttle mission.
"We will attempt to pin this issue down in our report, but there were a number of bureaucratic and administrative missed signals here,’ Gehman told senators. "We’re not quite so happy with the process."
The investigative board already had recommended that NASA push for better coordination between the space agency and military offices in charge of satellites and telescopes. The U. S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency in March agreed to regularly capture detailed satellite images of space shuttles in orbit.
Still, Gehman said it was unclear whether even images from America’s most sophisticated spy satellites might have detected on Columbia’s wing any damage, which Gehman said could have been as small as two inches square. The precise capabilities of such satellites was a sensitive topic during the Senate hearing.

A:"questions" (Para. 3, Line 1) B:"answers" (Para. 3, Line 1) C:"reporters" (Para. 3, Line 1) D:"investigators" (Para. 4, Line 1)

Text 3 This line of inquiry did not begin until earlier this month—more than three months after the accident—because there were "too many emotions, too many egos," said retired Adm. Harold Gehman, chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee, Gehman said this part of his inquiry was in its earliest stages, starting just 10 days ago. But Gehman said he already has concluded it is "inconceivable" that NASA would have been unable or unwilling to attempt a rescue for astronauts in orbit if senior shuttle managers and administrators had known there was fatal damage to Columbia’s left wing. Gehman told reporters after the hearing that answers to these important questions could have enormous impact, since they could place in a different context NASA’s decisions against more aggressively checking possible wing damage in the days before Columbia’s fatal return. Investigators believe breakaway insulating foam damaged part of Columbia’s wing shortly after liftoff, allowing superheated air to penetrate the wing during its fiery re-entry on Feb. 1 and melt it from the inside. Among those decisions was the choice by NASA’s senior shuttle managers and administrators to reject offers of satellite images of possible damage to Columbia’s left wing before the accident. The subject dominated the early part of Wednesday’s hearing. Gehman complained that managers and administrators "missed signals" when they rejected those offers for images, a pointedly harsh assessment of the space agency’s inaction during the 16-day shuttle mission. "We will attempt to pin this issue down in our report, but there were a number of bureaucratic and administrative missed signals here,’ Gehman told senators. "We’re not quite so happy with the process." The investigative board already had recommended that NASA push for better coordination between the space agency and military offices in charge of satellites and telescopes. The U. S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency in March agreed to regularly capture detailed satellite images of space shuttles in orbit. Still, Gehman said it was unclear whether even images from America’s most sophisticated spy satellites might have detected on Columbia’s wing any damage, which Gehman said could have been as small as two inches square. The precise capabilities of such satellites was a sensitive topic during the Senate hearing.

A:"questions" (Para. 3, Line 1) B:"answers" (Para. 3, Line 1) C:"reporters" (Para. 3, Line 1) D:"investigators" (Para. 4, Line 1)

Text 3

A:"questions" (Para. 3, Line 1) B:"answers" (Para. 3, Line 1) C:"reporters" (Para. 3, Line 1) D:"investigators" (Para. 4, Line 1)

An assembly line is ______.

A:a production line where each worker does only a small part of work to complete a product B:a house where many cars could be built in a single day C:a place where Henry could limit himself to the few tools for the task D:a workshop where the Model T was first produced in 1913

"This line" in Paragraph 3 refers to

A:the line from the Tower Gateway Station to Poplar. B:the line from Poplar to Island Gardens. C:the Millwall Extension Railway. D:the line from, Poplar to Stratford.