After the terrorist attacks in America last September, terrorist risk became the pariah of perils. The airline industry was most directly affected by the attacks, and it was the first to find that no one wanted to insure terrorist risk. Insurance companies immediately increased premiums and cut cover for airlines’ third-party terror and war liabilities to $ 50m per airline, per "event". Under pressure from airlines, the American government and the members of the European Union agreed to become insurers of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist liabilities, for a limited period. These government guarantees are due to expire at the end of the month.
The American government has already agreed to extend its guarantee for another 60 days. The EU’s transport ministers are meeting next week in Brussels to decide what to do. Insurers and reinsurers are keen for the commercial market to resume the provision of all airline insurance as soon as possible. No wonder: The premiums for such cover have inevitably increased considerably.
However, in the case of terrorism, and especially of terrorism in the skies, a number of special factors arise. Some are purely practical: a disaster as sudden and unforeseen as the attacks on the World Trade Center has had destructive effects on the insurance industry. The maximum cover for third-party terrorist risk available in the primary aviation market is now $ 50m, and that is not nearly enough cover risks that are perceived to be much higher since September 11th. Even if the market could offer sufficient cover, another catastrophe on such a scale would be more than the market could cope with.
In addition, a rare and devastating risk of a political nature is arguably one that it is right for governments to cover, at least in part. In the wake of attacks by Irish terrorists the British government has recognized this point by agreeing to back a mutual fund to cover risks to property from terrorist attack.
In the case of the airlines, the appropriate answer is some form of mutual scheme with government backing. In fact, under the code-name "Equitime", representatives of airlines, insurers and the American government are setting up an insurance vehicle to be financed by airlines and reinsured by the government. Governments would guarantee the fund’s excess. risk, but their role would diminish as the fund grew.
Setting something up will take time. So, to bridge the gap, governments will have to remain insurer of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist risk for some time to come.
According to the text, now it is beyond the ability of commercial insurance market

A:to win the support from governments. B:to cancel provision for airline insurance. C:to cope with overwhelming disasters. D:to rule out third-party terrorist risks.

After the terrorist attacks in America last September, terrorist risk became the pariah of perils. The airline industry was most directly affected by the attacks, and it was the first to find that no one wanted to insure terrorist risk. Insurance companies immediately increased premiums and cut cover for airlines’ third-party terror and war liabilities to ＄ 50m per airline, per "event". Under pressure from airlines, the American government and the members of the European Union agreed to become insurers of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist liabilities, for a limited period. These government guarantees are due to expire at the end of the month.
The American government has already agreed to extend its guarantee for another 60 days. The EU’s transport ministers are meeting next week in Brussels to decide what to do. Insurers and reinsurers are keen for the commercial market to resume the provision of all airline insurance as soon as possible. No wonder: The premiums for such cover have inevitably increased considerably.
However, in the case of terrorism, and especially of terrorism in the skies, a number of special factors arise. Some are purely practical: a disaster as sudden and unforeseen as the attacks on the World Trade Center has had destructive effects on the insurance industry. The maximum cover for third-party terrorist risk available in the primary aviation market is now $ 5Om, and that is not nearly enough cover risks that are perceived to be much higher since September 11th. Even if the market could offer sufficient cover, another catastrophe on such a scale would be more than the market could cope with.
In addition, a rare and devastating risk of a political nature is arguably one that it is right for governments to cover, at least in part. In the wake of attacks by Irish terrorists the British government has recognized this point by agreeing to back a mutual fund to cover risks to property from terrorist attack.
In the case of the airlines, the appropriate answer is some form of mutual scheme with government backing. In fact, under the code-name "Equitime", representatives of airlines, insurers and the American government are setting up an insurance vehicle to be financed by airlines and reinsured by the government. Governments would guarantee the fund’s excess risk, but their role would diminish as the fund grew.
Setting something up will take time. So, to bridge the gap, governments will have to remain insurer of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist risk for some time to come.
According to the text, now it is beyond the ability of commercial insurance market

A:to win the support from governments. B:to cancel provision for airline insurance. C:to cope with overwhelming disasters. D:to rule out third-party terrorist risks.

While disease is present prior to social organization, communal life creates special hazards. While the organization of society can reduce the dangers of disease, trade and urbanization, with their consequent problems of sanitation and pollution, can also aggravate such dangers. Even in the mid-twentieth century, during the brief calm between the polio and AIDS epidemics, epidemic health risks associated with carcinogens (cancer-producing substances ) from polluted air threatened the industrialized world. 　　To the economist, efforts to combat these risks are at least partially public goods. The benefits from public goods are indivisible among beneficiaries. A sole private purchaser of health care would give others in society a "free ride" with respect to the benefits obtained. To market theorists, such goods are lawful objects of governmental intervention in the market. While the theory of public goods helps explain aspects of public health law and assists in fitting it into modern economic theory, it omits a critical point. Ill health is not a mere byproduct of economic activity, but an inevitable occurrence of human existence. As a result, wherever there is human society, there will be public health. Every society has to face the risks of disease. And because it must, every society searches to make disease comprehensible within the context of the society’’s own particular culture, religion, or science. In this sense, health care is public not only because its benefits are indivisible and threats to it arise from factors outside of the individual but also because communal life gives individuals the cultural context in which to understand it. 　　Governments typically have assumed an active role with respect to health care, acting as if their role were obligatory. How governments have fulfilled that duty has varied throughout time and across societies, according not only to the wealth and scientific sophistication of the culture but also to its fundamental values--because health is defined in part by a community’’s belief system, public health measures will necessarily reflect cultural norms and values. 　　Those who criticize the United States government today for not providing health care to all citizens equate the provision of health care with insurance coverage for the costs of medical expenses. By this standard, seventeenth and eighteenth-century America lacked any significant conception of public health law. However, despite the general paucity (scarcity) of bureaucratic organization in pre-industrial America, the vast extent of health regulation and provision stands out as remarkable. Of course, the public role in the protection and regulation of eighteenth-century health was carried out in ways quite different from those today. Organizations responsible for health regulation were less stable than modern bureaucracies ,tending to appear in crises and fade away in periods of calm. The focus was on epidemics which were seen as unnatural and warranting a response ,not to the many prevalent and chronic conditions which were accepted as part and parcel of daily life. Additionally ,and not surprisingly ,religious influence was significant ,especially in the seventeenth century. Finally, in an era which lacked sharp divisions between private and governmental bodies, many public responsibilities were carried out by what we would now consider private associations. Nevertheless, the extent of public health regulation long before the dawn of the welfare state is remarkable and suggests that the founding generation’’s assumptions about the relationship between government and health were more complex than commonly assumed. The author’’s primary purpose is to

A:comment on the government role in health-care provision. B:argue about the social organization’’s tasks concerning health care. C:trace the historical development of the national health-care system. D:discuss the societal duty to make provision against epidemic diseases.

After the terrorist attacks in America last September, terrorist risk became the pariah of perils. The airline industry was most directly affected by the attacks, and it was the first to find that no one wanted to insure terrorist risk. Insurance companies immediately increased premiums and cut cover for airlines’ third-party terror and war liabilities to ＄ 50m per airline, per "event". Under pressure from airlines, the American government and the members of the European Union agreed to become insurers of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist liabilities, for a limited period. These government guarantees are due to expire at the end of the month.
The American government has already agreed to extend its guarantee for another 60 days. The EU’s transport ministers are meeting next week in Brussels to decide what to do. Insurers and reinsurers are keen for the commercial market to resume the provision of all airline insurance as soon as possible. No wonder: The premiums for such cover have inevitably increased considerably.
However, in the case of terrorism, and especially of terrorism in the skies, a number of special factors arise. Some are purely practical: a disaster as sudden and unforeseen as the attacks on the World Trade Center has had destructive effects on the insurance industry. The maximum cover for third-party terrorist risk available in the primary aviation market is now $ 5Om, and that is not nearly enough cover risks that are perceived to be much higher since September 11th. Even if the market could offer sufficient cover, another catastrophe on such a scale would be more than the market could cope with.
In addition, a rare and devastating risk of a political nature is arguably one that it is right for governments to cover, at least in part. In the wake of attacks by Irish terrorists the British government has recognized this point by agreeing to back a mutual fund to cover risks to property from terrorist attack.
In the case of the airlines, the appropriate answer is some form of mutual scheme with government backing. In fact, under the code-name "Equitime", representatives of airlines, insurers and the American government are setting up an insurance vehicle to be financed by airlines and reinsured by the government. Governments would guarantee the fund’s excess risk, but their role would diminish as the fund grew.
Setting something up will take time. So, to bridge the gap, governments will have to remain insurer of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist risk for some time to come.

A:to win the support from governments. B:to cancel provision for airline insurance. C:to cope with overwhelming disasters. D:to rule out third-party terrorist risks.

While disease is present prior to social organization, communal life creates special hazards. While the organization of society can reduce the dangers of disease, trade and urbanization, with their consequent problems of sanitation and pollution, can also aggravate such dangers. Even in the mid-twentieth century, during the brief calm between the polio and AIDS epidemics, epidemic health risks associated with carcinogens (cancer-producing substances ) from polluted air threatened the industrialized world. 　　To the economist, efforts to combat these risks are at least partially public goods. The benefits from public goods are indivisible among beneficiaries. A sole private purchaser of health care would give others in society a "free ride" with respect to the benefits obtained. To market theorists, such goods are lawful objects of governmental intervention in the market. While the theory of public goods helps explain aspects of public health law and assists in fitting it into modern economic theory, it omits a critical point. Ill health is not a mere byproduct of economic activity, but an inevitable occurrence of human existence. As a result, wherever there is human society, there will be public health. Every society has to face the risks of disease. And because it must, every society searches to make disease comprehensible within the context of the society’’s own particular culture, religion, or science. In this sense, health care is public not only because its benefits are indivisible and threats to it arise from factors outside of the individual but also because communal life gives individuals the cultural context in which to understand it. 　　Governments typically have assumed an active role with respect to health care, acting as if their role were obligatory. How governments have fulfilled that duty has varied throughout time and across societies, according not only to the wealth and scientific sophistication of the culture but also to its fundamental values--because health is defined in part by a community’’s belief system, public health measures will necessarily reflect cultural norms and values. 　　Those who criticize the United States government today for not providing health care to all citizens equate the provision of health care with insurance coverage for the costs of medical expenses. By this standard, seventeenth and eighteenth-century America lacked any significant conception of public health law. However, despite the general paucity (scarcity) of bureaucratic organization in pre-industrial America, the vast extent of health regulation and provision stands out as remarkable. Of course, the public role in the protection and regulation of eighteenth-century health was carried out in ways quite different from those today. Organizations responsible for health regulation were less stable than modern bureaucracies ,tending to appear in crises and fade away in periods of calm. The focus was on epidemics which were seen as unnatural and warranting a response ,not to the many prevalent and chronic conditions which were accepted as part and parcel of daily life. Additionally ,and not surprisingly ,religious influence was significant ,especially in the seventeenth century. Finally, in an era which lacked sharp divisions between private and governmental bodies, many public responsibilities were carried out by what we would now consider private associations. Nevertheless, the extent of public health regulation long before the dawn of the welfare state is remarkable and suggests that the founding generation’’s assumptions about the relationship between government and health were more complex than commonly assumed. The author’’s primary purpose is to

A:comment on the government role in health-care provision. B:argue about the social organization’’s tasks concerning health care. C:trace the historical development of the national health-care system. D:discuss the societal duty to make provision against epidemic diseases.

While disease is present prior to social organization, communal life creates special hazards. While the organization of society can reduce the dangers of disease, trade and urbanization, with their consequent problems of sanitation and pollution, can also aggravate such dangers. Even in the mid-twentieth century, during the brief calm between the polio and AIDS epidemics, epidemic health risks associated with carcinogens (cancer-producing substances ) from polluted air threatened the industrialized world. 　　To the economist, efforts to combat these risks are at least partially public goods. The benefits from public goods are indivisible among beneficiaries. A sole private purchaser of health care would give others in society a "free ride" with respect to the benefits obtained. To market theorists, such goods are lawful objects of governmental intervention in the market. While the theory of public goods helps explain aspects of public health law and assists in fitting it into modern economic theory, it omits a critical point. Ill health is not a mere byproduct of economic activity, but an inevitable occurrence of human existence. As a result, wherever there is human society, there will be public health. Every society has to face the risks of disease. And because it must, every society searches to make disease comprehensible within the context of the society’’s own particular culture, religion, or science. In this sense, health care is public not only because its benefits are indivisible and threats to it arise from factors outside of the individual but also because communal life gives individuals the cultural context in which to understand it. 　　Governments typically have assumed an active role with respect to health care, acting as if their role were obligatory. How governments have fulfilled that duty has varied throughout time and across societies, according not only to the wealth and scientific sophistication of the culture but also to its fundamental values--because health is defined in part by a community’’s belief system, public health measures will necessarily reflect cultural norms and values. 　　Those who criticize the United States government today for not providing health care to all citizens equate the provision of health care with insurance coverage for the costs of medical expenses. By this standard, seventeenth and eighteenth-century America lacked any significant conception of public health law. However, despite the general paucity (scarcity) of bureaucratic organization in pre-industrial America, the vast extent of health regulation and provision stands out as remarkable. Of course, the public role in the protection and regulation of eighteenth-century health was carried out in ways quite different from those today. Organizations responsible for health regulation were less stable than modern bureaucracies ,tending to appear in crises and fade away in periods of calm. The focus was on epidemics which were seen as unnatural and warranting a response ,not to the many prevalent and chronic conditions which were accepted as part and parcel of daily life. Additionally ,and not surprisingly ,religious influence was significant ,especially in the seventeenth century. Finally, in an era which lacked sharp divisions between private and governmental bodies, many public responsibilities were carried out by what we would now consider private associations. Nevertheless, the extent of public health regulation long before the dawn of the welfare state is remarkable and suggests that the founding generation’’s assumptions about the relationship between government and health were more complex than commonly assumed. The author’’s primary purpose is to

A:comment on the government role in health-care provision. B:argue about the social organization’’s tasks concerning health care. C:trace the historical development of the national health-care system. D:discuss the societal duty to make provision against epidemic diseases.

After the terrorist attacks in America last September, terrorist risk became the pariah of perils. The airline industry was most directly affected by the attacks, and it was the first to find that no one wanted to insure terrorist risk. Insurance companies immediately increased premiums and cut cover for airlines’ third-party terror and war liabilities to $ 50m per airline, per "event". Under pressure from airlines, the American government and the members of the European Union agreed to become insurers of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist liabilities, for a limited period. These government guarantees are due to expire at the end of the month.
The American government has already agreed to extend its guarantee for another 60 days. The EU’s transport ministers are meeting next week in Brussels to decide what to do. Insurers and reinsurers are keen for the commercial market to resume the provision of all airline insurance as soon as possible. No wonder: The premiums for such cover have inevitably increased considerably.
However, in the case of terrorism, and especially of terrorism in the skies, a number of special factors arise. Some are purely practical: a disaster as sudden and unforeseen as the attacks on the World Trade Center has had destructive effects on the insurance industry. The maximum cover for third-party terrorist risk available in the primary aviation market is now $ 50m, and that is not nearly enough cover risks that are perceived to be much higher since September 11th. Even if the market could offer sufficient cover, another catastrophe on such a scale would be more than the market could cope with.
In addition, a rare and devastating risk of a political nature is arguably one that it is right for governments to cover, at least in part. In the wake of attacks by Irish terrorists the British government has recognized this point by agreeing to back a mutual fund to cover risks to property from terrorist attack.
In the case of the airlines, the appropriate answer is some form of mutual scheme with government backing. In fact, under the code-name "Equitime", representatives of airlines, insurers and the American government are setting up an insurance vehicle to be financed by airlines and reinsured by the government. Governments would guarantee the fund’s excess. risk, but their role would diminish as the fund grew.
Setting something up will take time. So, to bridge the gap, governments will have to remain insurer of last resort for airlines’ war and terrorist risk for some time to come.

A:to win the support from governments B:to cancel provision for airline insurance C:to cope with overwhelming disasters D:to rule out third-party terrorist risks